iA


Germany’s lack of nuclear ambition

by Sven. Average Reading Time: about 8 minutes.

This is a slightly edited transcript of a contribution I made to Pod Delusion 88. In the original audio version, I had mistakenly stated that under the new German phase-out plans the last nuclear power plant would close by 2021. Actually, it’s 2022.

News from Germany! Our conservative / liberal coalition government suddenly doesn’t like nuclear power anymore. Within the next decade, Germany plans to close all of its nuclear reactors, and to boost renewables even more than originally planned. All of Germany? Well…

Before I continue, I need to put out two conflict-of-interest announcements and one disclaimer:

First: For the past ten years, I have worked for the Germany-based utility E.ON, which has stakes in about half of the German nuclear plants and operates about a third of them. While I worked for E.ON in the UK, I looked after conventional generation – this is coal, gas and nuclear plants. Since my return to Germany, I have worked in E.ON’s renewable business. So I know quite a bit about the technologies involved, and about both the UK and the German energy market.

Second: I am a psychologist, and currently do PhD research on the role of emotions in how we perceive risks. So while I certainly do not welcome the recent incidents at the Fukushima nuclear reactors, you may understand that the world’s and especially Germany’s reaction to those incidents is very interesting for me from a scientific perspective.

So the disclaimer needs to be: All of this is my personal evaluation and opinion. I am certainly not speaking on my employer’s behalf – neither for its nuclear nor for its renewables business.

That out of the way, here are the facts.

About 40 commercial nuclear reactors have been built in Germany since the 1960s, of which 17 are still operational today. For a long time, Germany had a reputation for state-of-the-art nuclear research, engineering, and operational experience. There has never been any significant nuclear incident in Germany.

Nuclear provides for about a quarter of Germany’s power production. The rest heavily relies on coal and even lignite plants, while gas plants play a minor role. This is a key difference to the UK, where gas is already big, and coal very much on the decline. One of the reasons is that the German coal and lignite mining industry have been protected far longer than the UK one, while the UK saw a rush for gas on the back of its former reserves in the North Sea.

From the political side, German Conservatives and Liberals have basically always supported nuclear, while the Green party actually grew out of the anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s. The Social Democrats have been sitting on the fence for a long time.

In 2000, the Green party had finally got into power as part of a coalition government with the Social Democrats – this was when long-term chancellor Helmut Kohl was succeeded by Gerhard Schröder. At this point the Greens pushed for the so called ‘Nuclear Consensus’ between the government and the power plant operators. The consensus became law in 2002 and states that no new nuclear plants will be built in Germany, and that the existing reactors are only allowed to generate a specific amount of power during their remaining lifetime. Under the consensus, the last German nuclear plant would have been closed in 2021.

Fast forward ten years, and the Conservatives and Liberals are in power again. In the Autumn of 2010, chancellor Angela Merkel announced the so-called ‘Life-time extension’, which would allow the remaining nuclear plants to run 12 years longer than under the consensus, with the last one closing in 2033. One of the key arguments for the life-time extension was that nuclear was seen as a reliable, low-carbon ‘bridging technology’ that would be required until renewables can provide for all demand – and that this was unlikely to be feasible by 2021.

The opposition and large parts of the public were furious, as they regarded this as a sell-out to the nuclear operators. Also, Merkel tried to design the new law in a way that would not require her to seek the approval by the council of the federal states – which she was unlikely to get, considering the existing majorities.

But not all was well for the utilities either. In exchange for the lifetime extension they were obliged to both pay into a renewables development fund, and also to pay an additional nuclear fuel tax, which would bring the government 2.6 billion Euros every year until 2016.

Since the announcement of the ‘life time extension’, several things have happened. First, some of the German federal states went to court, to have the legality of the law-making process investigated. Second, public opposition to other large infrastructure projects grew, in Germany especially regarding the demolition of the historic train station and surrounding areas in Stuttgart, the capital of federal state Baden-Württemberg. This in turn lead to ever decreasing popularity of the Conservatives and Liberals, and increasing popularity of the opposition, especially the Green party.

Then, Fukushima happened. Everyone was shocked, the opposition cried ‘told you so’ with regards to the risks of nuclear, the public went even more against the government, and the Green party claimed the federal state of Baden-Württemberg in elections, ending a Conservative reign that had lasted for decades.

The only way for Merkel to win back some sympathies was to make a complete u-turn on nuclear. She immediately ordered the 7 oldest German reactors to be turned off, plus another one, who was in maintenance at the time. This was announced as a temporary measure for 3 months, while the safety of all reactors should be investigated by one commission, and while another – so called ‘ethics’ commission – should discuss the ethical implications of nuclear power and make a recommendation about its future use in Germany.

Funny enough, the ethics commission did not include particular nuclear experts, but indeed parties deemed proficient in ethical questions, including the churches. Merkel did not want to make the mistake again to be seen to as being bought by the industry. However, at least the commission invited people like E.ON’s CEO to give their view in forms of testimonies.

After a very rushed process to define changes for about 6 major laws and some negotiations with the federal states, the German government’s current plan is as follows: The 8 nuclear reactors that had been temporarily turned off shall never be turned on again. The remaining 9 will be closed in defined batches, with the last one closing in 2022. So we are essentially back to the nuclear consensus of 2000.

However, with two major differences: Now there is much less flexibility in the actual closure dates. And the government still expects the operators to pay the additional nuclear fuel tax which was introduced alongside the previous life-time extension. Because half of the 17 reactors are already shut down, this tax will now only amount to about 1.3 billion Euros per year instead of the original 2.6 billion, but still the operators are expected to pay for a life-time extension they never got.

While the utilities do not want to work against the public’s will regarding a nuclear phase out, they are still obliged by their shareholders to ensure proper financial compensation. For example, the chancellor’s order to simply shut down the 8 reactors was legally unfounded. Only if there had been specific security concerns for any given reactor, such an order would have been legal, but this is not the case. Also, the operators now threaten to go to court over the nuclear fuel tax, as the life-time extension effectively does not take place. On both accounts their chances are not too bad, and I kind of expect government and operators to find some agreement. This however is just the financial side. Fact is, Germany will go nuclear-free by 2022. Again.

Is this feasible? Sure, Germany can live without nuclear, but it will have consequences.

Without nuclear, Germany at times needs to import more power from its neighbors, including nuclear power from France. More importantly, German coal plants will need to run more to cover the loss of nuclear capacity, and some already foresee a new generation of German coal and even lignite plants. I just hope more gas plants will be built quickly. In any case, this will lead to more CO2 emissions, making it more difficult for the EU to reach its overall CO2 targets, this increases the price of CO2 certificates, and this in turn increases electricity prices for everyone. This may not have a massive impact on private customers, but definitely on Germany’s industry, which is still heavy on steel, chemicals and manufacturing.

Also, Germany’s electricity grid is already strained, with lots of onshore wind in the north, and main demand in the south. With the nuclear plants the grid operators lose a large amount of reserve power to balance the grid. I don’t expect major blackouts, but this adds to the need for large-scale grid enhancements due to more renewables. And this during a time where a NIMBY attitude is more widespread than ever.

Finally, it is laudable that the government not only wants to shut down nuclear, but at the same time tries to change other provisions to accelerate the development of renewables. However, projects like offshore wind parks cost billions of Euros and require experience in large-scale construction projects. Guess who are the ones who actually undertake these kind of projects: Large international utilities. Using the money from the nuclear fuel tax to plug holes in the federal budget may seem straightforward to the Government, but it’s also money the German utilities then don’t have to invest in German renewables.

In summary, I believe that Germany can survive without nuclear, but nevertheless, this latest u-turn was mostly emotion- and opinion-driven, without proper regard to all its consequences. I will continue to watch the developments closely.

No comments on ‘Germany’s lack of nuclear ambition’

Leave a Reply